Re: Satellite Broadcasting?

["Robert J. Hansen" <cortana@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

> 1. Are encryption codes for satellites hardware burned
> in?  What is the encryption key length?  If the code
> is burned into the hardware, before it is put into
> orbit, you could not change the code.  At 128-bit
> encryption, it would take a GREAT deal of effort to
> decrypt it, regardless of the encryption scheme being
> used.  You would have to have the inside scoop, which

This is where cryptanalysis comes in.  I've broken 128-bit Blowfish and IDEA
before, by exploiting stupid design decisions in the implementation of the
algorithm (free hint: Unicode)--not an attack against the cipher, per se,
but how the cipher is fielded.  A friend of mine has managed to predict the
outcomes of random number generators which are based on the principle of
radioactive decay.  This is particularly amusing, since physics says
radioactive decay is totally random and unpredictable... but, as it turns
out, there's a surprising amount of predictability in the Geiger counters
which measure the radiation.

Cryptography *is not* security, and everybody in the industry knows it.

> is VERY hard to know, since only select people would
> have knowledge of what the exact key is.  I'm sure it
> would be in a safe somewheres under extreme security.

Try in the brain of a techie who's getting paid a little under six figures a
year, more likely.  Remember that the Walker spy scandal erupted because
access to America's most closely-guarded secrets was controlled by a Marine
earning $18K a year, who was in a foreign country and lonely--the perfect
target for a combination of woman's wile and bribery.

How much did it cost the Soviets to run the Walker ring?  Maybe $100K?  How
much would it have cost them to break the ciphers the hard way?  Definitely
in the millions.

Human attacks are usually far more effective, and infinitely more
cost-effective, than any other category of attacks.

> the threats to the hostages they may bring.  It is not
> US policy to allow terrorists such a powerful
> communications method.

Could you please point me in the direction of this EO (executive order)?  A
few times a year in the US, some deranged psychopath comes into a TV station
and hijacks the evening news.  The policy is to keep the cameras rolling
until the police arrive and tell them it's okay to turn them off, because
the station managers fear that pulling the plug will only frustrate the
terrorist into more action.

With hijacking a sat it's an even dicier proposition.  At that point, the
terrorist has infiltrated your networks pretty deeply; before you pull the
plug, you need to be sure that's not what the terrorist WANTS you to do.
You have to be certain that you aren't getting some very important data from
the broadcast you're going to be yanking: when the "Friends of the Scarlet
Dawn" are talking about how "you must free our political comrades from their
Sri Lankan jailors", you don't want to hit the off-switch before you've
heard all their demands.  And how do you know if that's all their demands?

That's also your only line of communication with the terrorists.  Do you
really want to cut that off?  It'll really do a great thing for
negotiations, axing their feed like that...

That's also your /best chance/ for finding out where they are.  They have to
be uploading from somewhere, and any signal can be traced given a diligent
enough commo operator.  The longer you can keep them on the air, the better
your likelihood of finding out where the uplink site is.